



# THE EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION IN SOMALIA: AN ASSESSMENT

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## I. Introduction

The European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) provides the military pillar of the European Union's (EU) efforts to help stabilize the country.<sup>1</sup> Established in 2010, EUTM Somalia's early mandate focused on delivering tactical training support to the newly reconstituted Somali National Army (SNA) working for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Strategic advising was added in 2013 during the mission's third mandate renewal.

EUTM Somalia is now part of the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) plan, adopted in 2017 by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and international partners as part of a security pact.<sup>2</sup> EUTM Somalia's objectives are to increase 'the proficiency, effectiveness, credibility and accountability of the Somali defense sector to enable Somali authorities to take over security responsibilities progressively'.<sup>3</sup> The mission hopes to achieve these goals by delivering training and strategic advice. This includes tailored training and capacity-building activities to help deliver a 'sustainable Somali-owned training system' and, since 2016, training infantry companies, ideally that are multi-clan and integrated.<sup>4</sup> The strategic advising and mentoring of SNA general staff and Ministry of Defence (MOD) personnel includes drafting keystone documents and policies and encouraging civilian oversight of the SNA.

This paper provides an overview of EUTM Somalia's activities and an assessment of its impacts since it was established in 2010. It is based on a review of relevant primary and secondary sources, 42 semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders and two focus group discussions with SNA officers. These interviews were conducted during July and August 2020. The interviews were carried out adhering to social distancing practices in Mogadishu or remotely due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020. Nearly half of the interviewees were SNA officers who had received some form of EUTM Somalia training. Other interviewees

<sup>1</sup> Other EU entities in Somalia include the civilian EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Somalia), the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR Somalia) and the EU delegation.

<sup>2</sup> Specifically, EUTM Somalia supports CAS Strand 2A, which deals with the military dimension, while EUCAP Somalia supports Strand 2B, the police dimension. See UK Government, 'London Somalia Conference 2017: Security pact', Policy paper, 11 May 2017.

<sup>3</sup> EUTM Somalia, 'Factsheet', Aug. 2019.

<sup>4</sup> EUTM Somalia, 'Mandate and objectives', [n.d.]; and EUTM Somalia, [n.d.].

## SUMMARY

● This report provides an overview of the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and assesses its impact on Somalia's conflict dynamics since it was established in 2010. It is part of a larger Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) project analysing the effectiveness of the European Union's (EU) training missions in Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic.

The report analyses EUTM Somalia's main training and advisory activities before assessing its political and operational impacts. It then summarizes the main factors that account for the mission's successes and limitations and sketches three future scenarios for the mission.

It concludes that EUTM Somalia had a positive political impact on the EU's relationship with the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union. However, the mission's impact on Somalia's conflict dynamics was very limited until 2019, when a direct link was finally established between EUTM Somalia training and operational deployment of Somali units in offensive and stabilization operations.



were officials from the EU and various international partners to EUTM Somalia, including the African Union (AU), the United Nations and a range of states. All interviews and focus groups were conducted on a confidential basis. A framework developed by the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON), a network of over 40 research partners from across the globe, is used to assess the mission's impact.<sup>5</sup> The framework measures the impact of a peace operation by its ability to prevent armed conflict and sexual violence; build confidence among local parties; stabilize the area; protect civilians; strengthen public safety; promote human rights; contribute to peace dividends; extend state authority; support institution building and development; reform the security sector; promote the rule of law; and support community policing and transitional justice. The framework explains an operation's impact with reference to the following factors: the primacy of politics; realistic mandates and matching resources; a people-centred approach; legitimacy and credibility; coordination and coherence; and promoting the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.

This paper is organized as follows: Sections II and III summarize the background and context in which EUTM Somalia works and the activities it undertakes. Section IV analyses the impact of EUTM Somalia, focusing on the political, operational and general dimensions, as described by the interviewees. Section V uses the relevant factors from the EPON framework to explain EUTM Somalia's successes and limitations. Section VI outlines three plausible future scenarios for the mission, and section VII summarizes the main conclusions.

## II. Background

EUTM Somalia was established on 15 February 2010 and deployed to Uganda on 7 April 2010 because the situation in Somalia was considered too dangerous.<sup>6</sup> The need for such a mission can be traced to December 2006 when Somalia's TFG was brought to Mogadishu with the help of over 10 000 Ethiopian soldiers. In the process, the TFG and Ethiopian forces ousted the Union of Islamic Courts, which had controlled Mogadishu since June of the same year.<sup>7</sup> In response to what it saw as the installation of an illegitimate Somali government and an Ethiopian invasion, the Islamist group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Mujahedin Youth Movement, or al-Shabab) led an armed resistance.<sup>8</sup> As battle ensued, al-Shabab's recruits increased dramatically, and so too did Ethiopia's casualties and financial costs. Within months, Ethiopia's then prime minister, Meles Zenawi, was looking for a way out of Mogadishu by pushing the AU to take over the job of protecting the TFG.

The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) duly deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007, paving the way for Ethiopia's withdrawal in January 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network, 'About us', [n.d.].

<sup>6</sup> Council of the European Union, 'Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP of 31 March 2010 on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)', L87/33, 31 Mar. 2010.

<sup>7</sup> For details, see Williams, P. D., *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission, 2007–2017* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2018), chapters 1–3.

<sup>8</sup> See Hansen, S., *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group* (Hurst Publishers: London, 2013).



However, one of the major problems was the lack of an effective national Somali army. It was this capability gap that EUTM Somalia was designed to help fill.

Politically, EUTM Somalia was intended to help strengthen the EU's partnership with the AU by adding a more practical dimension to existing—largely financial—support to AMISOM. More generally, the training mission was to demonstrate the EU's ability to provide military capability in support of its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the mission was placed under the political-strategic control of EU member states via the EU Political and Security Committee.

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At the operational level, EUTM Somalia was intended to help with force generation for the fledgling SNA, which had only been reconstituted in 2008 after disbanding in 1991 when Somalia's central government collapsed.<sup>9</sup> Initially, EUTM Somalia's concept was to develop Somali forces that could partner with AMISOM so the peacekeepers could focus on anti-al-Shabab operations. In the longer term, building an effective set of Somali security forces was a crucial part of AMISOM's exit strategy.<sup>10</sup>

During its first four years, EUTM Somalia operated from the Bihanga training camp in Uganda due to the dire security situation in Mogadishu. It joined other countries, notably Ethiopia and Uganda, that were already training Somali forces.<sup>11</sup> EUTM Somalia's initial goal was to train 2000 Somali recruits; to do so, from 2011 EUTM Somalia consisted of approximately 150 to 200 personnel, drawn from between 7 and 15 EU member states and some third states, such as Serbia. Many EU states have not provided personnel to EUTM Somalia, and unfortunately there have been persistent vacancies within the mission over its decade of operation.<sup>12</sup>

By late 2011, EUTM Somalia had trained some 1800 Somali recruits up to platoon level (half of whom returned to Somalia in February 2011 and half in September 2011).<sup>13</sup> By the time EUTM Somalia moved all its activities to Mogadishu in January 2014, it had trained approximately 3600 troops.<sup>14</sup> By August 2017, that number had risen to 'some 5000 soldiers'.<sup>15</sup> By August 2020, EUTM Somalia had trained nearly 7000 SNA personnel—roughly half of them from infantry units, with the rest being a mix of specialist units, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), officers and trainers.<sup>16</sup>

EUTM Somalia now includes training and advisory teams. The Training Team works with international partners to develop a Somali-owned training

<sup>9</sup> Robinson, C., 'Revisiting the rise and fall of the Somali Armed Forces, 1960–2012,' *Defense & Security Analysis*, vol 32, no. 3 (2016), pp 237–52.

<sup>10</sup> Williams (note 7), chapter 13.

<sup>11</sup> Later, other countries also got involved in training Somali forces, notably Qatar, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>12</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020. The European Parliament has also called for such vacancies to be reduced, see European Parliament, 'European Parliament resolution of 16 September 2020 on EU–African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (2020/2002/INI)', 16 Sep. 2020.

<sup>13</sup> EU official, Interview with author, Addis Ababa, 2 May 2012.

<sup>14</sup> European Union External Action Service (EEAS), 'EUTM Somali starts its training activities in Mogadishu', Press release, 25 Feb. 2014.

<sup>15</sup> EUTM Somalia, 'Live fire exercise for the 1st Company of the "Flame" Battalion', Press release, 29 Aug. 2017.

<sup>16</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.



system, including using the General Dhagabadan Training Centre. The Advisory Team supports and provides advice to the MOD and SNA general staff. EUTM Somalia also has an approximately 60-strong force protection unit, provided by Italy, and a level-2 hospital managed by the private firm International SOS.<sup>17</sup> In February 2020, EUTM Somalia acquired a new headquarters building.<sup>18</sup> For the period February 2010 to end of December 2020, the ‘common costs’ of EUTM Somalia covered by the EU’s Athena mechanism—the mechanism that handles the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy—are approximately €90 million.<sup>19</sup> The mission has not suffered any fatalities, although al-Shabab has twice used car bombs to attack the mission’s convoys: in October 2018 and September 2019.<sup>20</sup>

### III. EUTM Somalia’s activities

EUTM Somalia’s main activities can be summarized as providing training and strategic advice. However, it has also engaged in international coordination efforts and a small number of civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) activities. Also of note, in 2020, the EU agreed EUTM Somalia could provide military equipment to the SNA under the new European Peace Facility, which is due to take over from the EU’s African Peace Facility in 2021.

#### **Training**

EUTM Somalia has engaged in training private individuals, Somali trainers, infantry and specialist units, leaders (mainly platoon and company commanders) and headquarters staff. It also worked with the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) while in Uganda. The UPDF provided basic training to rank and file soldiers, while EU trainers taught specialized skills, including medical evacuation, countering improvised explosive devices and urban warfare techniques, to junior officers and NCOs.<sup>21</sup> In the mission’s

<sup>17</sup> The Force Protection Unit is comprised of 3 platoons (COVID-19 temporarily reduced the number to 2). The unit allows EUTM Somalia to engage regularly and frequently with the SNA and MOD on their own ground including support and training sites in Mogadishu. It is also the only way for the US-led Military Coordination Cell and the UK to conduct activities in Mogadishu such as SNA battalion assurance visits, a key part of the force generation process. EU official, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 2020. The hospital had 3 specialist medics, 5 nurses, 1 laboratory technician and 1 radiographer.

<sup>18</sup> EUTM Somalia, ‘New headquarters for the EUTM-S contingent’, Press release, 19 Feb. 2020.

<sup>19</sup> The breakdown of expenditure is approximately: 2010–12 (€4.8 million); 2013–14 (€17.1 million); 2015–16 (€18 million); 2017–18 (€27 million); and 2019–20 (€22.9 million). Figures taken from EUTM Somalia, ‘Home’, [n.d.], except the 2010–12 figures, which are from EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), *The EU Security Policy Toolbox* (EUISS: Paris, 2013), p. 272. The Athena mechanism finances the common costs of the EU’s military operations via contributions from the member states based on their gross national income.

<sup>20</sup> EUTM Somalia, ‘Statement by the spokesperson on the attack’, Press release, 2 Oct. 2018; and EUTM Somalia, ‘Explosion in Mogadishu against EUTM-S: No soldiers wounded’, Press release, 30 Sep. 2019.

<sup>21</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG), *Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support*, Africa Report no. 170 (ICG: Brussels, 21 Feb. 2011), p. 15, footnote 84; and Oksamytna, K., ‘The European Union Training Mission in Somalia and the limits of liberal peacebuilding: Can EUTM contribute to sustainable and inclusive peace?’ *International Spectator*, vol. 44, no. 4 (Dec. 2011), p. 97.



early years, the different training modules were led by one or two EUTM Somalia countries. The training therefore reflected their national armies' expertise and hence did not deliver a consistent experience for the SNA.<sup>22</sup> The focus of EUTM Somalia later shifted to developing SNA command and control structures, and the capacity to self-train. The plan was to give the SNA 'the capability to perform by themselves basic training in Mogadishu within a period of one year'.<sup>23</sup> This was the genesis of the mission's 'train the trainers' courses, conducted in Somalia and Uganda. By 2019 six 'train the trainers' courses had been completed.<sup>24</sup> They have proved one of the most popular aspects of EUTM Somalia.<sup>25</sup>

Regarding unit training, EUTM Somalia has focused on basic infantry training via approximately 20-week courses to generate and regenerate existing SNA light infantry units.<sup>26</sup> This started in 2016 with 150 troops in the Pilot Light Infantry Company, followed by 100 soldiers in the 1st Flame Company and 137 troops in the 2nd Flame Company during 2017.<sup>27</sup> By 2019 EUTM Somalia had trained three newly recruited light infantry companies, which formed the SNA's 143rd Light Infantry Battalion (approximately 450 persons).<sup>28</sup> The mission's current goal is to train 500 people per year, equating to four companies. Using SNA trainers, trained by EUTM Somalia, the mission should be able to increase this capacity significantly.

Specialist unit training included courses for military engineers, military medical personnel and military police.<sup>29</sup> Leadership training focused on platoon leaders and company commanders to improve their command and leadership skills. Headquarters training included courses on the situation room, command post exercises and SNA staff training (especially for the SNA troops in Sector 12 April).

Overall, EUTM Somalia has trained 6891 SNA personnel since 2010.<sup>30</sup> This comprises 567 trainees on officer courses, 933 trainees on NCO courses, 3540 trainees on troops courses, 446 trainers on 'train the trainers' courses,

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<sup>22</sup> Oksamytna (note 21), p. 99.

<sup>23</sup> Cited in Oksamytna (note 21), p. 98.

<sup>24</sup> See EUTM Somalia, 'EUTM-S completes "Train-the-trainers course" for Somali National Army', Press release, 1 May 2019.

<sup>25</sup> This point was frequently mentioned by the SNA interviewees.

<sup>26</sup> Topics covered in the EUTM Somalia courses included, self-defence, infiltration tactics, working in hostile environments, mitigating friendly fire, minimizing collateral death or damage, rescuing casualties on the battlefield, use of light and heavy weapons, discipline and self-control, wireless communication skills, first aid treatment, combat medical assistance/lifesaving, close protection, leadership, live firing, war (offensive and defensive operations), basic command and control, fighting in populated areas, mine and improvised explosive device awareness, checkpoints, direct protection checkpoints, driving, observance of the rights of civilians, the law of armed conflict, and human rights and gender mainstreaming.

<sup>27</sup> EUTM Somalia, *EU CSDP Missions and Operations: Annual Report 2017* (EEAS: Brussels, 2017), p. 25.

<sup>28</sup> See EUTM Somalia, 'EUTM-S completes infantry training for Somali National Army (SNA) personnel', Press release, 7 Apr. 2019.

<sup>29</sup> In early 2020, EUTM Somalia provided pre-deployment support for Darwiish forces before their deployment in Operation Badbaado. For some specific purposes EUTM Somalia can acquire the EU's Military Planning and Conduct Capability approval to advise Somali police units but cannot train them. EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>30</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020. Interestingly, AMISOM provided precisely the same numbers. AMISOM official, Email communication with author, 27 Aug. 2020.



330 trainees on combat engineer courses, 668 trainees on military police courses and 407 trainees on other courses.<sup>31</sup> It is unclear how many of these soldiers have taken multiple courses with EUTM Somalia or have received training from other international actors.

The mission's activities have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Although EUTM Somalia continued training and advisory activities, it did so through remote support such as video teleconferencing. The mission's Training Team also set up a new distance learning system at its headquarters and in the SNA training centre, which included use of EUTM Somalia interpreters and dedicated video lessons.<sup>32</sup>

### Advice

EUTM Somalia started its advisory activities when it moved from Uganda to Somalia in 2014. Its Advisory Team works with senior Somali security officials, mainly in the MOD, SNA general staff and the SNA training element, ideally in close coordination with other international actors. This is classified as the major focus of EUTM Somalia's sixth mandate, intended to support goals such as strengthened civilian oversight and institution building.<sup>33</sup> Infrastructure construction at Villa Gashandiga (the MOD/SNA headquarters complex) and the Joint Security Sector Governance Programme (a joint programme financed by the EU with contributions from Sweden and the United Kingdom), which supports civil servant development within the FGS (and some federal member states) line ministries, including the MOD, have complemented the mission's advisory efforts.<sup>34</sup>

### International coordination

EUTM Somalia must coordinate its activities with other international actors involved in training and advising the Somali security sector to achieve its goals and as part of the multilateral structure of CAS Strand 2A. EUTM Somalia therefore frequently interacts with AMISOM, the United States-led Military Coordination Cell in Mogadishu and the UK's support mission, Operation Tanager. The UK and the USA in particular regularly exchange information with EUTM Somalia, and the mission has a liaison officer assigned to AMISOM and to the US-led cell. To a lesser degree, EUTM Somalia is also engaged in coordination with a longer list of stakeholders interested in supporting the CAS Strand 2A, which includes the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Somalia), the EU delegation to Somalia, the SNA, the Somali MOD and UN missions.<sup>35</sup> However, it is important to

<sup>31</sup> For comparison, by Mar. 2020, Turkey had delivered 4 trained 'Eagle' battalions (of about 350 soldiers each) equipped with weapons and communications equipment, and recently with a dozen donated armoured personnel carriers. These troops have also deployed on operations, including against some of the FGS's political opponents in the regions. US Inspector General, *East Africa Counterterrorism Operations* (Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress: Alexandria, VA, Jan.–Mar. 2020), p. 31.

<sup>32</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>33</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>34</sup> In early 2020 EUTM Somalia budgeted approximately €4.5 million to contribute to infrastructure projects to further develop SNA headquarters capabilities. US Inspector General (note 31), p. 31; and UK official, Email communication with author, 6 Aug. 2020.

<sup>35</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.



highlight that it was not until May 2018 that the FGS signed an agreement with the EU, Turkey, the UK and the USA to commit to using North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards for all SNA training.<sup>36</sup>

### **Civil–military cooperation**

Some contingents and the mission’s CIMIC cell have engaged in activities intended to support the local civilian population, although these are not a principal focus of EUTM Somalia’s mandate. For example, there was a blood donation campaign in October 2017 following a huge terrorist attack in Mogadishu by al-Shabab; the Spanish contingent donated boots and personal supplies to their SNA trainees (January 2018); and EUTM Somalia personnel donated school supplies to an orphanage in Mogadishu (February 2020).

### **Equipment provision**

The EU has provided little equipment to its trainees for most of EUTM Somalia’s existence. Under the EU’s African Peace Facility, the EU was not permitted to provide lethal equipment (weapons and ammunition) but could provide other equipment for EUTM Somalia’s military trainees, including uniforms and radios.<sup>37</sup> However, in early 2020 the EU agreed to supply the FGS and EUTM Somalia-trained units with a military equipment package as part of the new European Peace Facility that will take over from the EU’s African Peace Facility in 2021.<sup>38</sup> The equipment could include weapons, munitions and transport. The package for Somalia could involve some €20-million-worth of equipment going to the trained units involved in Operation Badbaado, a joint operation being conducted by Somali forces and international partners in the Lower Shabelle region since mid-2019.<sup>39</sup> This EU initiative is not directly connected to EUTM Somalia.<sup>40</sup> The specific list of equipment will be decided centrally by the EU, and it is unclear whether it will be selected in consultation with the SNA.<sup>41</sup>

## **IV. The impact of EUTM Somalia**

The interviews and the desk-based research carried out for this paper highlight that EUTM Somalia has had only a minor—but overall most likely positive—impact on conflict dynamics in Somalia, with most of its positive operational impact since 2019.

<sup>36</sup> SNA official, Interview with author, 27 Feb. 2019.

<sup>37</sup> See Africa–EU Partnership, ‘African Peace Facility’, [n.d.].

<sup>38</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020; and European Parliament, ‘Legislative train schedule: A stronger Europe in the world’, [n.d.].

<sup>39</sup> See also US Inspector General (note 31), p. 31.

<sup>40</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 16 Aug. 2020.

<sup>41</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 2020.



## Impact in terms of political factors

### *Credibility*

In political terms, the existence of EUTM Somalia bolstered the EU's credibility as a legitimate and consistent partner to the Somali authorities in their time of need and to the AU, by demonstrating the EU could support military operations in an active war zone. However, the EU was unable to do this alone. While based in Uganda (2010–13), EUTM Somalia had to rely on several other partners in addition to Uganda. US support was crucial, in particular financial and logistical assistance including 'participating in the selection of trainees, airlifting recruits, and providing supplies and equipment'.<sup>42</sup> AMISOM, which reintegrated the EU-trained soldiers back into the SNA in Somalia, was also critical for EUTM Somalia. From early 2011, when the first batch of trained troops arrived back in Somalia, those soldiers then underwent 'two to three months of reintegration training by AMISOM, as well as some advanced training'.<sup>43</sup>

### *Selection process*

Moreover, the political partnership between the EU and Somalia meant EUTM Somalia was not in control of selecting its trainees, who were selected by the Somali TFG and then the FGS. It appears the Somali authorities sometimes sent the same people to multiple trainings, individuals were frequently only loosely connected to composite units and sometimes clan identity dictated the selection of trainees (and whether they were subsequently deployed on particular operations).<sup>44</sup> Issues related to the clan homogeneity

of trainees were often reported as being a source of complaints about EUTM Somalia from a range of stakeholders.<sup>45</sup> These limitations also affected EUTM Somalia's ability to deliver a group of SNA trainers with a comprehensive skill set for the recommended training needs.<sup>46</sup> In addition, the presence of other international training programmes meant there was a

degree of internal competition over where the SNA's best recruits were sent. Even today, the EU must still broadly accept the units that are delivered for training. For example, in September 2020 the European Parliament called for EU instructors to be able 'to select soldiers from among those proposed by the local governments'.<sup>47</sup> In previous years it is unclear how much autonomy EUTM Somalia had to reject trainees proposed by the FGS. For example, there are reports that international partners have been involved in vetting trainees since at least 2014.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Oksamytna (note 21), p. 100.

<sup>43</sup> International Crisis Group (note 21), p. 16, footnote 85.

<sup>44</sup> US official, Email communication with author, 18 Nov. 2017.

<sup>45</sup> UN, Security Council, 'Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2015): Somalia', S/2016/919, 31 Oct. 2016, pp. 80–81.

<sup>46</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>47</sup> European Parliament (note 12).

<sup>48</sup> The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia reported vetting of SNA personnel took place in mid-2014 at the Jazeera Training Centre in Mogadishu, conducted by a joint AMISOM, EUTM Somalia, SNA and UN screening team. UN, Security Council (note 45), p. 326.





### *Relationship building*

Many EUTM Somalia advisers have been deployed on tours of duty lasting six months. This relatively short rotation period and the subsequent high staff turnover within EUTM Somalia limited the mission's ability to build relationships within the SNA and the Somali MOD. Even with better key leader engagement programmes, it would have been especially beneficial for the Advisory Team members to have longer deployments.<sup>49</sup> High turnover also increased the risk of undermining operational continuity, poor institutional memory and handover briefings, as well as difficulty developing local expertise.

### **Impact in terms of operational factors**

As one interviewee noted, creating effective military units requires a five-step process, where all steps are critical.<sup>50</sup> The steps involved are: (a) assessing the intended purpose of the mission, the available budget and the type and number of personnel required; (b) selecting the people to be trained; (c) training trainees to a high standard; (d) equipping trainees to operate effectively in the field; and (e) mentoring trainees on their field operations.

While EUTM Somalia performed reasonably well on steps (a) and (c), it was unable to control step (b), it could do little in relation to step (d) and almost nothing on step (e).

### *Skills*

The mission's impact was distinctly limited in operational terms until recently. On the positive side, EUTM Somalia improved the skill level of individuals and, later, some units in the SNA. The FGS and the SNA have expressed appreciation for the skills acquired. In spring 2020 for example, Somalia's Chief of Defence Forces asked EUTM Somalia to run more platoon and company commander courses, the implication being that this training is helping to prepare Somalia's young military leaders.<sup>51</sup> In addition, almost all SNA interviewees said they valued the skills taught by EUTM Somalia. This is a clear positive impact, even if EUTM Somalia did not provide as comprehensive training packages as Turkey and the USA. Importantly, some interviewees also noted how EUTM Somalia training helped instil more military discipline and some esprit de corps within the SNA, which have been two major problems afflicting the army thus far.<sup>52</sup> This might be useful for reducing the risk of a coup d'état.

### *Link to field operations*

The tangible operational impacts of EUTM Somalia activities were minimal for its first seven years because there was no clear connection between its training activities and SNA operations in the field. Some interviewees

<sup>49</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 16 Aug. 2020; and World Bank official, Interview with author, 23 July 2020.

<sup>50</sup> Contractor, Interview with author, 22 July 2020.

<sup>51</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>52</sup> Former FGS official, Interview with author, 5 Aug. 2020; and AMISOM official, Email communication with author, 27 Aug. 2020.



postulated there may even have been some negative impact on the EU's reputation inasmuch as it had operated a training mission for years without producing a direct link to effective operational units in the field.<sup>53</sup> It also looked poor in comparative terms when contrasted with other assistance programmes, notably those offered by Turkey and the USA. As noted above, the key practical issue was whether EUTM Somalia could generate functional SNA units to degrade al-Shabab, which is, ultimately, a critical measure of the army's operational effectiveness.

EUTM Somalia was unable to provide lethal equipment to its trainees, despite the dire state of SNA equipment stocks. Again, this was in contrast to the training programmes provided to the SNA by Turkey and the USA. As EUTM Somalia recognized, the SNA suffered 'from lack of equipment of all types, not least weapons. To form other types of units, such as engineer units and logistic units, a considerable amount of equipment needs to be donated.'<sup>54</sup> However, the EU's development framework did not permit the provision of lethal equipment. As noted above, this may be reversed in 2021, which might see lethal military equipment going to some trained SNA units under the new European Peace Facility.<sup>55</sup>

A related issue raised by some Somali interviewees was the lack of stipends. Here, the EU's approach was limited in two respects. First, its decision to route its stipends through the UN meant that not all Somalis were clear the EU was funding such initiatives. Second, the FGS's practice of reducing salaries for some of the personnel who received EU stipends left the EU effectively subsidizing salaries rather than incentivizing training and skills development. This was connected to the broader problem that SNA soldiers were paid their salaries neither on time nor in full until recently. As one UN official noted in 2017: 'How can you expect them to fight, risk their lives and not resort to extortion if they don't even know how to feed their families?'<sup>56</sup> This issue directly affected EUTM Somalia. For example, it was reported in February 2016 that EUTM Somalia 'temporarily cease[d] training operations at Jazeera Training Camp over fears of insecurity prompted by unpaid [SNA] salaries'.<sup>57</sup> In addition, there were more basic issues concerning the limitations of the EU's training facilities. Many of the SNA interviewees commented on the lack of appropriate accommodation and food available for trainees during their courses, as well as language barriers despite the mission hiring interpreters.<sup>58</sup>

***EUTM Somalia sometimes found it difficult to track all its trainees' subsequent progress***

*Post-training activities and evaluation*

Arguably the mission's biggest limitations came in relation to the lack of field mentoring, and what happened to the EU's trainees after their courses had finished. EUTM Somalia sometimes found it difficult to track all its train-

<sup>53</sup> Former EU official, Interview with author, 23 July 2020.

<sup>54</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>55</sup> The European Parliament recently called on EUTMs to supply their training centres 'with both shared and individual military equipment (if the country concerned does not provide them)'. European Parliament (note 12).

<sup>56</sup> UN official, Interview with author, 7 Sep. 2017.

<sup>57</sup> UN, Security Council (note 45), p. 83.

<sup>58</sup> Points made by numerous SNA interviewees and focus groups, and AMISOM official, Email communication with author, 27 Aug. 2020.



ees' subsequent progress. Nor could it effectively monitor and assess how its trained units performed in the field once the SNA deployed them. For example, in 2016 'EUTM Commander, Brigadier General Maurizio Morena, stated that they have no way of knowing where EUTM Somalia trained soldiers are, or whether they are in a position to implement the skills they were taught.'<sup>59</sup> In its 2016 report the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia also noted it received 'anecdotal evidence suggesting many troops trained by the EUTM Somalia are currently employed by private security companies'.<sup>60</sup>

EUTM Somalia remains unable to evaluate the impact of its training on SNA operations, although the EU's ability to track its trainees after completing the training has improved over the last couple of years. As the mission itself noted: 'There are also very limited ways and methods to evaluate training done and subsequently the quality of the training, due to the security environment and the fact that EUTM Somalia doesn't deploy to the areas of operations.'<sup>61</sup> Similarly, in September 2020 the European Parliament called for EU instructors 'to supervise and accompany [their trainees] on the ground once they have finished their training, in order to assess them and prevent units from disbanding and soldiers from dispersing'.<sup>62</sup>

***EUTM Somalia remains unable to evaluate the impact of its training on SNA operations***

Rectifying such gaps would require EUTM Somalia to adopt a radically different posture, including integrating mission personnel into the SNA headquarters to establish an accurate feedback mechanism to monitor training results.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, it would almost certainly require a change to the mission's current 'train and release' approach, whereby trainees do not receive field mentoring.<sup>64</sup> This was adopted in large part because the EUTM Somalia mandate excluded operations in the Somali regions outside of Mogadishu. One former EU official recalled how, EUTM commanders sometimes accompanied the EU ambassador on political missions to Somalia's regions in order to gain better situational awareness of events outside Mogadishu. This enabled them to gauge what the SNA's training needs really were and, by also visiting AMISOM sector commanders, facilitated better tactical level coordination with the AU mission.<sup>65</sup> The unwillingness of EU member states to operate beyond Mogadishu stemmed from the low level of risk the mission's contributing countries were willing to accept for their deployed personnel.

*Focus on Mogadishu*

Some of the difficulties for EUTM Somalia operating beyond Mogadishu were made apparent in late 2017. At that time, the UK requested EUTM Somalia support a course on headquarters training to SNA Sector 12 April and general staff. For a few days during September and October preparations for developing the syllabus involved several EUTM Somalia personnel

<sup>59</sup> UN, Security Council (note 45), pp. 80–81.

<sup>60</sup> UN, Security Council (note 45), p. 80, footnote 101.

<sup>61</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>62</sup> European Parliament (note 12).

<sup>63</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>64</sup> The US-trained Danab units are the only SNA units that have received field mentoring by US and contractor personnel.

<sup>65</sup> EU official, Email communication with author, 19 June 2015.



travelling to and staying at the UN compound in Baidoa, although the training was to be conducted in Mogadishu.<sup>66</sup> EUTM Somalia had to meet numerous preconditions from the EU for its personnel to conduct reconnaissance and prepare the materials in Baidoa.<sup>67</sup> However, even if EUTM Somalia's contributing countries were willing to take such risks, the mission would still need to be significantly reconfigured, probably to include more formed units—rather than individual officers—explicitly configured to perform such field mentoring. This could massively increase the support burden on EUTM Somalia in areas such as medical evacuation, force protection, and forward repair and recovery of vehicles.<sup>68</sup> It is unclear whether this task could be contracted to a private firm such as in the case of the USA with Bancroft Global Development.<sup>69</sup>

### *Linking training to operations*

Significant progress has been made since 2016, when EUTM Somalia started providing courses to (re)generate light infantry companies for the SNA through its pilot company programme. By 2019 the first evidence emerged of a direct link between EUTM Somalia training and operational deployment of functional units in offensive and stabilization operations. This came from EUTM Somalia trainees participating in Operation Badbaado—an operation involving AMISOM, international and Somali forces to recover the so-called Shabelle River bridge towns in the Lower Shabelle region south-west of Mogadishu from al-Shabab.<sup>70</sup> Their principal role was to act as holding forces in these ongoing operations. Specifically, the first three infantry companies trained in EUTM Somalia's light infantry courses were deployed to the SNA's 143rd Battalion. The fourth company was split between different units, including front-line combat units. The fifth company was divided into two platoons that deployed as front-line reconnaissance units and one platoon deployed to the General Gordon military training camp.<sup>71</sup> In addition to SNA units, EUTM Somalia personnel also provided pre-deployment assistance to some 300 Darwiish who were deployed to help stabilize the bridge towns in February 2020. The US Africa Command called this an 'accomplishment' because previously the Darwiish had mostly operated checkpoints in Mogadishu.<sup>72</sup>

### **General impacts**

Overall, the non-EU interviewees identified three main areas where EUTM Somalia had a small but discernible impact: extension of state authority, stabilization of the country and institution building, and civilian impacts.

<sup>66</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 5 Aug. 2020.

<sup>67</sup> Former EUTM official, Interview with author, 27 July 2020.

<sup>68</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 2020.

<sup>69</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 16 Aug. 2020.

<sup>70</sup> The bridge towns are widely seen as being 'key terrain' in the war, not only because of the flow of commercial goods through them but also because they acted as a corridor by which al-Shabab ferried personnel and equipment to launch various types of attacks in Mogadishu.

<sup>71</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>72</sup> US Inspector General (note 31), p. 31.



### *Extension of state authority*

Interviewees reported that EUTM Somalia helped extend state authority in the Lower Shabelle region following the launch of Operation Badbaado in 2019. Interestingly, this was seen as an overwhelmingly positive impact, which contrasted to the more controversial use by the FGS of some Turkish-trained ‘Eagle’ battalions against some of the government’s political opponents in Somalia’s regions.

### *Stabilization of the country and institution building*

The interviewees thought EUTM Somalia had the greatest positive impact in terms of stabilizing Somalia through its support for security sector reform. One official referred to EUTM Somalia as ‘a key cornerstone of the international community’s security sector reform effort’ in Somalia.<sup>73</sup> Institution building and development has occurred mostly within the SNA and the Somali MOD. Some interviewees praised EUTM Somalia in this context for helping to define key functions and organizational structures inside the MOD and SNA general staff. EUTM Somalia personnel have also assisted in drafting important documents, such as the SNA’s disciplinary code and the National Defence Act, which is still awaiting approval by the Somali Federal Parliament.<sup>74</sup> In terms of infrastructural developments, EUTM Somalia also helped merge and co-locate the Somali MOD and SNA headquarters to enable closer coordination.

### *Civilian impacts*

The interviewees also considered EUTM Somalia activities to have had small, indirect positive impacts on the protection of civilians, the human rights environment and preventing conflict-related sexual violence. This occurred through courses that SNA trainees received on international humanitarian law, human rights law and preventing sexual violence. It was also noted that EUTM Somalia provided some helpful CIMIC training to help deal with the numerous local grievances articulated by local populations during Operation Badbaado.<sup>75</sup>

## V. Explanatory factors behind the impact of EUTM Somalia

What factors can best explain EUTM Somalia’s overall impacts? As noted, the following brief reflections are organized around the framework developed by EPON. This explains an operation’s impact with reference to the following explanatory factors, where relevant: the primacy of politics; realistic mandates and matching resources; a people-centred approach; legitimacy and credibility; coordination and coherence; and promoting the WPS agenda.

<sup>73</sup> UK official, Email communication with author, 6 Aug. 2020.

<sup>74</sup> Former FGS official, Interview with author, 30 July 2020.

<sup>75</sup> Former contractor, Interview with author, 28 July 2020.



### **Lack of political primacy**

As discussed in section IV, it is clear that neither the EU nor EUTM Somalia wield much political authority in Somalia. EUTM Somalia can train only the personnel sent by the FGS. Furthermore, the mission is not in a strong position to question proposals from SNA headquarters, which at times lack coherence or are not well constructed, especially because of the frequent turnover of senior SNA officials.<sup>76</sup> EUTM Somalia has therefore remained largely reactive to proposals derived outside the mission. In addition, it has had to deal with high levels of political uncertainty about key strategic issues, such as the lack of an agreed national constitution, the lack of an agreed national security architecture, and the lack of political reconciliation between the FGS and several of Somalia's regional administrations. The mission has also faced problems from some Somalis who want to promote their own clan at the expense of others and from some members of an older generation of military officers who were reluctant to accept necessary reforms.<sup>77</sup>

EUTM Somalia has had to carry out a largely technical and tactical agenda in a context where the politics of the security sector were not conducive to building a professional set of national security forces.<sup>78</sup> Indeed, the EU's general reluctance to wield political conditionality led one former Somali official to opine that the EU should impose conditionalities more often and more strongly. EUTM Somalia, he said, did not come with a clear set of demands and conditions for training. Unlike other states that regularly used conditions and explicitly stated 'red lines', EUTM Somalia did not use a carrot and stick approach. In Somalia, however, he argued that this is precisely what is needed (at least in private) to build professional security forces and structures.<sup>79</sup>

### **Unrealistic mandates and mismatched resources**

EUTM Somalia's mandate reflected and reinforced the limitations within the political sphere. Its narrow focus on training—later expanded to encompass advising—meant the mission was forced to adopt a partial 'train and release' approach. The mission lacked the mandate and means to equip and pay its trainees, and, crucially, the ability to mentor its trainees in the field. In Somalia, only the US programme to develop the Danab forces followed all five steps of the process to build functional units (outlined in section IV above). EUTM Somalia would require additional resources and would have to reconfigure its force posture accordingly if it were to offer field mentoring to trained units. Adding this provision to the mandated tasks would also involve contributing countries assuming significantly higher risk to their personnel. Moreover, such a change would require the unanimous approval of all EU member states, not just those contributing to the mission.

<sup>76</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 2020.

<sup>77</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>78</sup> See Keating, M. and Abshir, S., *The Politics of Security in Somalia* (New York University: New York, Apr. 2018); and Williams, P. D., 'Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–18', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 43, no. 3 (2020).

<sup>79</sup> Former FGS official, Interview with author, 5 Aug. 2020.



### **Lack of a people-centred approach**

As a mission with a narrow mandate focused on training and advice, EUTM Somalia is most directly engaged with key leaders in the Somali MOD and SNA, and other international partners trying to stabilize the country. The mission is not directly people centred in the sense of catering to the local civilian population. However, its focus on strengthening the military arm of the Somali state could theoretically help protect the population from certain types of threats. The mission's training and advice might reduce the likelihood of Somali forces abusing the local population. However, there is a risk that its activities to strengthen the SNA might help facilitate a coup d'état, given the poor state of civil–military relations. EUTM Somalia also struggled to disseminate information about its activities to a range of audiences. For example, complaints were raised during this research that EUTM Somalia was not well known to local civilians—a point made by almost all SNA interviewees.

### **Legitimacy and credibility**

EUTM Somalia is widely seen as a legitimate and credible institution. Its legitimacy derives from the EU as a source of authority, as well as its authorization from the UN Security Council, its support from the AU and its invitation from the Somali authorities. The mission's credibility derives mainly from the EU's long-term commitment to Somalia as part of its integrated approach. EUTM Somalia has developed high levels of trust with Somali government officials and the SNA over time, although the frequent turnover of senior Somali officials has diminished the impact of such relationships. Only one interviewee mooted the FGS was not filling all the available course places, which might suggest some EU training was not as highly valued as some other programmes.<sup>80</sup>

***In Somalia, the 'EU fails to operate as a single actor across its military and diplomatic missions'***

### **Coordination and coherence problems**

There were problems of coordination among the different elements of the EU's activities related to Somalia, which for years reported separately to the central EU and its various departments. It was therefore difficult for EUTM Somalia to deliver a unified effort with EUCAP Somalia, the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR Somalia), the EU delegation to Somalia and the relevant EU departments in Brussels.<sup>81</sup> As one EU official put it, in Somalia the 'EU fails to operate as a single actor across its military and diplomatic missions'.<sup>82</sup> EUTM Somalia also struggled at times to coordinate with other international partners engaged in training and advising the Somali security sector. This has improved since 2010, with a degree of international coordination built into the formulation of the CAS strands (if not always in their implementation). The 2018 decision to use NATO standards to train the SNA was also

<sup>80</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 2020.

<sup>81</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 16 Aug. 2020; and UK official, Email communication with author, 6 Aug. 2020.

<sup>82</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 2020.



useful in this regard. However, there have been varied levels of coordination in practice. In general, EUTM Somalia coordinated best with other Western actors (the UK and the USA), somewhat less effectively with AMISOM and Turkey, and little with the United Arab Emirates' now defunct training programme. For example, during this research, an AMISOM official opined that AMISOM did not always receive timely updates about relevant EUTM Somalia activities.<sup>83</sup>

The mission's mandate addresses a logical gap in terms of coherence, but it is too narrow in its design scope. One EU official also noted some incoherence in the mission's operational planning, specifically, that EUTM Somalia's advisory activity tended 'to be generated bottom-up by individual advisers taking their own approach to what is needed in their area or responding to the requests of Somali counterparts for support. The result is a fragmented effort which lacks consistency over time or between subject areas and is often distorted by Somali focus on poorly considered priorities.'<sup>84</sup> However, the main problem concerning coherence was that the EUTM Somalia mandate focused narrowly on training and advice without providing the requisite capabilities to engage in monitoring, evaluation and mentoring of its trainees' subsequent activities in the field. As noted above, these elements are crucial parts of the process to deliver effective military units.

### **The Women, Peace and Security agenda**

The WPS agenda has played a minimal role in EUTM Somalia activities. This is partly driven by the local political context. Even today, there are only a reported 900 women serving in the SNA, and reporting suggests sexism is still common in the security sector.<sup>85</sup> Fifteen women currently serve in EUTM Somalia but the mission noted that gender advisers had been a 'missing capability' for many years.<sup>86</sup> Nevertheless, the mission has incorporated a range of courses addressing aspects of the WPS agenda, such as on sexual and gender-based violence, and its Advisory Team has been developing a gender equality policy for the Somali MOD.

## **VI. The future of EUTM Somalia**

Interviewees articulated three broadly incompatible positions on what the future of EUTM Somalia should entail. Of course, their views could shift depending on the future activities of other relevant actors in Somalia, including AMISOM, and Ethiopian and US forces. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, and in order of the numbers of interviewees supporting this view, the options were to continue the mission in roughly the same vein as its current configuration, scale up the mission or close it down.

<sup>83</sup> AMISOM official, Email communication with author, 27 Aug. 2020.

<sup>84</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 2020.

<sup>85</sup> Dahir, A. L., 'Somalia's army told her to sew a skirt', *New York Times*, 14 Aug. 2020.

<sup>86</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.





## **Maintain the status quo**

Those interviewees in favour of EUTM Somalia continuing in its current form highlighted that over the last few years EUTM Somalia has finally established the missing link between training and operational deployments (mainly via its trainees deployed in Operation Badbaado), after a long period of generating little operational impact. This has been possible in part because the SNA finally embarked on a set of offensive operations in 2019, albeit not the ones initially set out in the 2018 Somali Transition Plan. Operation Badbaado enabled EUTM Somalia to play a useful niche role in generating adequate holding forces that could complement the US-trained Danab and Turkish-trained Eagle units.

In addition, it was noted that the EUTM Somalia force protection unit provides a unique means to move personnel around Mogadishu. This remains important for the US-led Military Coordination Cell and UK personnel to conduct activities with the SNA outside the Mogadishu International Airport compound. Without this capability, the UK or USA would have to provide an alternative.

## **Scale up and reform EUTM Somalia**

The main arguments made by interviewees in favour of scaling up and reforming EUTM Somalia were that the mission would be more useful if it could increase the number of training activities it carries out and the number of trainees it engages with, especially via Somali trainers. It could also expand the scope of its training to include a more diverse curriculum for the SNA, to provide training to more senior advisers on long-term contracts in the MOD and perhaps to include training for the federal police. In addition, EUTM Somalia could invest in building its own training facility, perhaps using either the Turkish or US models. A potential radical reconfiguration would include expanding EUTM Somalia operations beyond Mogadishu to include field mentoring, thereby increasing its locations and deploying to Somalia's regions. This would entail greater costs and risks.

## **Close down EUTM Somalia**

Some interviewees noted that the EU's broad shift of emphasis towards the Sahel and the loss of the UK as a contributing country might weaken EUTM Somalia's position within the EU. However, the main argument articulated for closing down the mission is that on balance its minimal operational impact is not worth the amount of resources invested. As one interviewee put it: 'EUTM Somalia has headquarters staff sufficient in number for a brigade HQ and of significantly higher rank, all to exercise command of the training and the advisory teams, totalling approximately 30 "mission delivery" personnel.'<sup>87</sup> Closing EUTM Somalia would also help the FGS to reduce the number of actors providing training to its security forces. This could be helpful in increasing coherence across SNA training and reducing the number of different systems and mechanisms the Somali authorities

<sup>87</sup> EU official, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 2020.



need to engage with. However, it would need to be done without significantly reducing the level of force generation for the SNA.

Nevertheless, most of the interviewees argued that closing EUTM Somalia would cause more problems than it might solve. To give just a couple of representative illustrations, the mission itself noted that closure would result in ‘a terrific loss of credibility for the EU. If the EU should leave Somalia it cannot be excluded that it would be seen as the EU abandoning Somalia.’<sup>88</sup> For its part, a senior AMISOM official argued that: ‘Closing EUTM would adversely affect the capacity building efforts of the SNA . . . [It would be] disastrous.’<sup>89</sup>

## VII. Conclusions

The desk-based research and interviews conducted suggest EUTM Somalia has had a positive political impact on the EU’s relationship with the Somali authorities and the AU, by providing a military capacity-building component. However, poor strategic coordination among the different elements of the EU’s activities in Somalia has often undermined the EU’s overall impact. While EUTM Somalia’s strategic advising function has played a useful role in developing the Somali MOD and SNA, Somalia’s fragmented political landscape has meant advising activities were not tied directly to an agreed strategic vision of the armed forces and national security architecture. The mission’s advising roles have also been frequently conducted by personnel on short tours of duty.

***EUTM Somalia has had a positive political impact but the mission’s impact on Somalia’s conflict dynamics has been limited in operational terms***

The mission’s impact on Somalia’s conflict dynamics has been limited in operational terms. It was not until the launch of Operation Badbaado in 2019 that there was significant evidence of a direct link between EUTM Somalia training and operational deployment of functional Somali units in offensive and stabilization operations.

Several factors explain this limited impact. First, EUTM Somalia was mandated to implement a largely technical and tactical agenda in a context where the politics of Somalia’s security sector were not conducive to building a professional set of national security forces. Second, EUTM Somalia lacked the mandate and means to equip and pay its trainees, which reduced their potential effectiveness and reduced the mission’s political impact in comparison to other international security assistance programmes. It is significant that the EU’s position on equipping trained SNA units may change under the new European Peace Facility. A third, related factor was the lack of a field mentoring capability within EUTM Somalia, which meant the mission essentially ran a suboptimal ‘train and release’ programme. Field mentoring was identified as a prerequisite for delivering military units capable of offensive operations. Adding this task to the mission’s mandate would require the assent of all EU member states and a significant expansion and reconfiguration of the mission’s role in Somalia. For such mentoring to take place outside Mogadishu in Somalia’s regions, EU member states would need to be willing to assume higher costs and greater risk to their personnel.

<sup>88</sup> EUTM Somalia, Email communication with author, 1 Aug. 2020.

<sup>89</sup> AMISOM official, Email communication with author, 27 Aug. 2020.



## Abbreviations

|                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| AMISOM           | African Union Mission in Somalia           |
| AU               | African Union                              |
| CAS              | Comprehensive Approach to Security         |
| CIMIC            | Civil–military cooperation                 |
| COVID-19         | Coronavirus disease 2019                   |
| EPON             | Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network  |
| EU               | European Union                             |
| EUCAP Somalia    | European Union Capacity Building Mission   |
| EUNAVFOR Somalia | European Union Naval Force                 |
| EUTM Somalia     | European Union Training Mission in Somalia |
| FGS              | Federal Government of Somalia              |
| MOD              | Ministry of Defence                        |
| NATO             | North Atlantic Treaty Organization         |
| NCO              | Non-commissioned officer                   |
| SNA              | Somali National Army                       |
| TFG              | Transitional Federal Government            |
| UN               | United Nations                             |
| UPDF             | Ugandan People’s Defence Forces            |
| WPS              | Women, Peace and Security                  |

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### SIPRI BACKGROUND PAPER

# THE EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION IN SOMALIA: AN ASSESSMENT

PAUL D. WILLIAMS AND HUSSEIN YUSUF ALI

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This project was commissioned and financed by Cordaid, a development and humanitarian organization, working to end poverty and exclusion. The research for this work was done in cooperation with EUTM Somalia and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Sincere gratitude goes to these organizations for making the research possible. Views expressed and information contained in this document are the responsibility of the author(s).

